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troubling you with suggestions, but as I cannot but feel alarmed in consequence of the Japanese consul's remarks, I am sending this confidential telegram to your Excellency. If there is really any proposal of the kind, I would earnestly entreat your Excellency to firmly decline to yield. It would be preferable to make some other concession to them in its place. If there are no grounds whatever for these apprehensions of mine, there is nothing more to be said.
(2.)
Wai-wu Pu to Viceroy.
Your telegram No. with reference to the Kirin-Huining Railway.
Mr. 1juin quotes the second section of article 3 of the Kirin-Chang-ch'un convention, which provides that any branch-lines or extensions of the Kirin-Ch'ang- ch'un railway, which may subsequently be constructed shall be managed by China, and that if China has not sufficient funds for their construction she shall obtain them from the South Manchurian Railway Company, and he presses for an arrangement similar to that for the Kirin-Ch'ang-ch'un loan. Mr. Ijuin also states that although no immediate action is to be taken it is essential that a declaration to this effect should be made beforehand. This Board urged that the funds should be provided by China herself, but the Japanese Minister persists in declining to agree, and unless this point is settled the Yen-chi (boundary) negotiations cannot be continued. After carefully weighing the considerations on both sides we have decided that we cannot endanger the whole situation by again breaking off the negotiations and have accordingly arranged with him to follow the same course as in the case of the Kirin-Ch'ang-ch'un line, and borrow half the amount required. The line will be built by us, the control will be in our hands, and it will not be a Japanese railway. After long consideration we have come to the conclusion that this is the only course possible.
(3.)
Governor of Kirin to Wai-wu Pu.
1 have just received a telegram from his Excellency Hsi-liang informing me that the Yen-chi boundary question is approaching a settlement, but that there are rumours that your Excellencies have agreed to the construction of a line from Huining to Kirin on the terms of the Kirin-Chang-ch'un convention, and to borrow half the amount required from Japan. I fully realise the difficult position in which the board is placed, and the necessity for taking into account every aspect of the situation, but knowing as I do the special importance of the boundary question to this province, and conscious of the extreme gravity of the present position of affairs, I feel it my duty to submit my views to your Excellencies, and I trust that you will pardon me for doing so.
The Japanese perceived from the first that the question of the boundary between China and Corea gave them an opportunity, and their first project was to take forcible possession of our territory; subsequently, when they had established com- munications by water with Ching Ching and built a railway to connect it with Huining they secured for themselves the still greater advantages conferred by the Kirin-Chang-ch'un convention. They then perceived that by getting possession of the Kirin-Huining Railway also they would secure much greater advantages than by forcibly occupying a piece of our land, and accordingly changed their tactics and declared that the construction of railways was the only means of settling the boundary question. The frontier question, however, has nothing whatever to do with the construction of railways, and however great concessions should be made to them, they should only be in matters connected with the boundary, such as the opening of ports or the right of affording protection to the Coreans. Even if it is necessary to make some great concession to them in return for their services it would be better to hand over the 100 li or so of land to them altogether so as to avoid trouble in the future.
As regards the 3rd article of the Kirin-Changchun convention, this concerns the construction of branch lines, but a line nearly 1,000 li in length from Kirin to
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Huining must be regarded as another trunk line, and has nothing to do with this article. The Kirin-Changchun convention was agreed to by us in order to secure the redemption of the Hsinmintuu-Changchun line, which had been seized by the Japanese, and there was therefore some reason for making it; but in the present case we have not accepted the delimitation of the boundary as claimed by the Japanese, and if, in return for the settlement of the boundary question, we surrender these important rights to Japan, our loss will be out of all proportion to our gain. Besides, even now Kirin only preserves its existence because the South Manchurian Railway only reaches Changchun and Kirin, and, for lack of communications, the Japanese are unable to put their plans fully into effect. If this line is built, and the Japanese have the rights conferred by a loan agreement, then, with their railways from Dalny and Antung, they will completely surround the two provinces of Kirin and Fengtien. They will then be in a position to increase their demands to furnish loans for the construction of branch lines to the Kirin-Changchun and Kirin-Huining Railways, their settlers and traders will pour into Kirin, and there will be no limit to the pressure which they will be able to put upon us. Furthermore, if this line is constructed, the Japanese and their goods can reach Kirin by way of Ch'ing-ching and Huining in a day, and they will thereby secure much greater advantages than would accrue from the opening of ports in Yen-chi, whilst our ruin will be brought about all the quicker.
This, however, is only the least of the dangers to be feared. The Russians are daily becoming more eager to revenge themselves on the Japanese. Since Vladi- vostock was made a naval harbour, the number of troops has been vastly increased, and munitions of war have been coming out incessantly by the Siberian Railway. The intention of the Russians is to avenge their defeat within a few years and to make the province of Kirin the battle-ground. The Japanese realise this, and are making Yen-chi a base for their operations against Russia. If, however, Russia is to have access to Kirin by the Chinese Eastern Railway whilst Japan is hampered by lack of communications, the latter will be at a disadvantage, and Japan has accordingly changed her tactics from attempting to forcibly occupy Yeu-chi to a demand for this railway, whereby she will be able in the event of trouble to occupy Kirin before the Russians. This matter is of the most vital importance to Russia, and she has been closely watching the progress of the boundary negotiations. It is hardly likely that she will acquiesce in the present arrangement, and she will probably make it a pretext for demanding corresponding concessions, and it is greatly to be feared that the rival ambitions of the two countries will hasten the advent of hostilities and involve us in the most dreadful calamities.
However worthless my views on the situation may be, the facts are obvious, and I cannot but feel the utmost alarm. There is, too, another point. The Kirin-Ch'ang- chun convention excited great opposition amongst the people of this province, and the agitation against it was continued for almost a year. Upon my arrival here I did my best to put a stop to the agitation, and finally succeeded in bringing about peace, although the people were still dissatisfied. If this Kirin-Huining agreement is signed, the people will be still more roused to opposition, and there will be grave reasons for anxiety. I now hear that, although the matter has been decided, the agreement has may still not yet been signed, and if your Excellencies will fight the case strongly it be possible to save the situation and secure some modification of the terms.
(4.)
Governor of Kirin to Viceroy of Manchuria.
On receipt of your Excellency's telegram I telegraphed to the Wai-wu Pu urging them to fight the case strongly, and also sent you a reply. I now hear that, in addition to the arrangement for the joint working of the Kirin-Huining Railway, five ports are to be opened, the Japanese have the right to protect the Coreans, mixed courts are to be established, Japanese are permitted to carry on business as before in Yen-chi, and this provision includes the working of the Tien Pao Shan mines; we have agreed that no parallel line shall be constructed west of the Liao River, and we have also given them the right to build a railway from Tashinichiao to Yingk'ou. It is commonly rumoured that the agreement has already been signed. I cannot but feel the utmost indignation at this news.
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